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SUMMARY 
 
This study applied the Process Dissociation Procedure (Bornstein, 2002) to test 
independence between personality processes represented by different implicit 
measurement techniques. In contrast to the commonly adopted literal view of dual 
processes in personality theory, the study predicted that two implicit measures (CRT-A 
and IAT-A) and one explicit measure (NEO-AH) of aggressive disposition would 
dissociate with each other in their 1) intercorrelations, 2) predictions of behavioral 
criteria of aggressiveness, and 3) potential moderation by situational cues. These 
hypotheses were generally, though not completely, supported. Most importantly, the two 
implicit measures dissociated in their lack of correlation and differential prediction of 
behavioral criteria, unaffected by changes in situational cues. As predicted, the CRT-A 
and the NEO-AH dissociated in their intercorrelations, predictions, and moderation by 
incentives. The IAT-A and the NEO-AH dissociated in their lack of intercorrelation and 
their differential moderation by changes in incentive conditions. As predicted, only the 
explicit measure was moderated by changes in incentive conditions. Unexpectedly, IAT-
A and the NEO-AH were statistically indistinguishable in their prediction of behavioral 
criteria of aggression. The findings provided strong support for the hypotheses predicting 







Dual process theories occur across wide ranging areas of psychological research – 
including personality. A conscious (explicit) process measured by self-reports is typically 
contrasted with an unconscious (implicit) process measured by indirect means (Bornstein, 
2002; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Wilson & Dunn, 2004). Social 
cognition researchers generally agree that the two systems operate by different principles 
in determining behavior (Deutsch & Strack, 2006). The conscious involves intentional 
and controlled processes that are available for verbal report, whereas the unconscious 
involves automatic and involuntary processes that are normally inaccessible to conscious 
awareness (Bargh & Morsella, 2008).  
Intriguingly, the findings of the researchers in the various fields are “remarkably 
consistent from theory to theory”, so much so, in fact, that some have attempted to 
formulate a “generic dual-system theory” (Evans, 2008; p. 258). For example, it has been 
proposed that a fast-binding memory system and a slow-learning system operate within, 
if not also across, all of the various psychological domains.  
“We would also like to suggest that the dual-memory system interpretation also 
applies to implicit and explicit measures of other phenomena, assuming that the 
implicit measure represents automatic processing while the explicit measure 
represents conscious processing” (DeCoster, Banner, Smith & Semin, 2006; p. 
18).  
It follows from a literal interpretation of dual processes that different implicit 
measures of a particular psychological domain (e.g., aggression) should converge as 
alternate representations of a single underlying unconscious process (see for example 
   2
Fazio & Olsen, 2003; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker, 
2000). However, the literal interpretation may be incomplete. It is argued in this study 
that two independent processes are too few to accurately portray the empirical 
relationships observed among distinct implicit measures of personality. There may be 
more than one independent implicit personality process.  
The remainder of this paper develops this proposition. It first outlines a set of 
standards to demonstrate the independence between two personality processes. With 
these standards in mind, it looks at evidence for dual processes found in research that 
compares different implicit and explicit personality measures. In the same light, it 
reviews and critiques studies that compare different implicit personality measures to each 
other. It describes a study which tests hypotheses that at least two implicit processes are 
involved in aggression. These processes are not only independent of explicit measures, 
but are also independent of each other. 
 
Standards to Establish Independent Personality Processes 
 
What evidence will be accepted to demonstrate that two personality measures 
represent independent personality processes? Bornstein (2002) recommended the process 
dissociation procedure, originally developed in teasing apart implicit and explicit 
processes in memory and learning. This procedure establishes three standards to 
differentiate independent processes. First, the two measures should have no more than 
moderate intercorrelations – in the range of .20 to .40. Higher correlations would suggest 
the measures simply assess the same or substantially similar processes. Second, both 
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measures should predict domain-relevant criteria. Should the two measures predict 
different behaviors it would represent stronger evidence that different processes are 
involved. Finally, the predictions of the two measures should be differentially affected by 
moderating variables. A moderating variable should affect scores on one type of test but 
not the other, or a moderator should affect scores on the two types of tests in different 
ways. Such interactions indicate that the two systems rely on and operate on different 
information in the performance situation.  
Stated simply, three rigorous standards to establish independent personality 
processes result from this analysis: (1) lack of intercorrelation, (2) prediction of different 
domain-related criteria, and (3) differential moderation of their validities. According to 
Bornstein (2002), if two personality variables meet these standards, one may logically 
conclude that the measures represent separate and distinct personality processes. In the 
sections that follow, these standards will be applied to a review of research addressing the 
differentiation of processes represented by various explicit and implicit measures of 
personality.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN PERSONALITY 
 
Three approaches to the implicit measurement of personality provide evidence for 
dual personality processes: the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 
1935), the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), and 
the Conditional Reasoning Test (CRT; James, 1998). The evidence suggests the implicit 
measures TAT, the IAT, and the CRT represent different processes than those 
represented by explicit measures. Before discussing this evidence, explicit measures and 
each implicit measure are introduced, and the cognitions they assess are described.   
 
Explicit Components Personality 
 
Explicit measures of personality assume that people can accurately observe, 
recall, and describe their personalities. Examples include the Jackson Personality Form 
(PRF; Jackson, 1984), the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1987) and 
the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R: Costa & McCrae, 1992). These 
measures employ direct assessments like questionnaires and surveys which rely on self-
reports. Participants consciously evaluate a series of self-descriptive propositions such as 
“I easily become angry when frustrated.” This is viewed as an introspective process, 
because participants “must turn their attention inward to determine whether their 
experience corresponds to the statement in a test item” (Bornstein, 2007, p. 365). 
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Therefore, the cognitions assessed by explicit measures represent introspections, 
conscious self-evaluations, or self-attributions. The term self-reports is often used. 
Implicit Components Personality 
Measuring nonconscious processes is not so straightforward. The final outputs of 
a nonconscious process – choices, recollections, words, actions – may be consciously 
observed or expressed (see James, McIntyre, Glisson, Green, Patton, LeBreton, Frost, 
Russell, Sablynski, Mitchell, & Williams, 2005, Figure 1). However, the impetus for 
these behaviors may be unreportable, unknowable, and misattributed to other causes 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Critical factors for understanding personality and behavior, 
such as latent motives and defense mechanisms, are thought to be either too threatening 
to permit accurate self-report (Murray, 1938) or outside of one‟s awareness (McClelland, 
1951). Consequently, it is imperative to assess nonconscious processes by indirect 
observation of behavioral indicators that are normally unavailable to consciousness 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James, 1998).  
 
Thematic Apperception Test 
 
The TAT is a traditional projective test. It requires researchers to infer personality 
characteristics from free responses to standard pictures of people in ambiguous 
interactions (Murray, 1938). Participants follow standard instructions to construct brief 
stories about each picture. Researchers then identify subjective themes and score them 
according to “coding books” developed through the analysis of known groups 
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(McClelland, Atkinson, Lowell, & Clark, 1958). What this reveals was thought to be a 
function of the Freudian defense mechanism of projection, hence the term projective test.  
Murray (1938) later assumed that personality-dependent interpretative processes 
(i.e., apperception) influence the unconscious themes expressed in TAT stories. People 
with high levels of an implicit motive are thought to be highly sensitive to and 
preoccupied with the goal of taking advantage of generalized cues that signal natural 
incentives for that motive (McClelland, 1985). This concern affects the activation and 
articulation of themes attributed to ambiguous stimuli (Weinberger & McClelland, 1990). 
Current views hold that the response to ambiguous stimuli is guided by unconscious 
classification into a priori interpretative themes. In other words, the stimuli embodied in 
TAT pictures are unconsciously differentiated and assigned meaning according to one‟s 
pre-existing system of categories (Bornstein, 2007). The cognitive mechanisms engaged 
by the TAT may be described as unconscious preoccupations, concerns, or goals.  
The Dissociative Hypothesis. McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger (1989) 
proposed that scores on self-reports and the TAT represent separate personality systems. 
As evidence, the authors cited one of the earliest studies to compare TAT and self-report 
measures of the achievement motive (deCharms, Morrison, Reitman, & McClelland, 
1955). The implicit and explicit measures were not correlated, and they predicted 
different behaviors. TAT scores significantly predicted performance on an anagram task 
and the holding of office, whereas self-reports predicted neither. In contrast, self-reports, 
but not the TAT, predicted conforming one‟s art judgments to an expert‟s opinion. The 
authors concluded that TAT and self-reported motive measures “produce two different 
scores which signify different things as far as the rest of the subject’s behavior is 
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concerned” (p. 422). McClelland, et al. (1989) went on to argue that self-reports predict 
behaviors and choices in short-term situations when social incentives are present (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1970; Bandura, 1982). In contrast, they argued implicit motives predict 
longer term outcomes such as entrepreneurial behavior (McClelland, 1965; McClelland, 
1987), and managerial success (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982) in the absence of socially-
conveyed incentives.   
A study by Biernat (1989) found that TAT achievement motivation was not 
significantly correlated the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS; Edwards, 
1957) or the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS; Rokeach, 1973). The TAT predicted solving 
math problems whereas EPPS and RVS scores did not. However, EPPS scores predicted 
who said they would lead a group if asked, but TAT scores did not. The TAT and RVS 
measures of affiliation were also uncorrelated. A group with high RVS affiliation scores 
chose more affiliation goals than a group high on RVS achievement scores. Conversely, 
the group high on RVS achievement chose more achievement goals that the affiliation 
group. In contrast, TAT measures of achievement and affiliation were unrelated to goal 
choices.  
In two experiments Koestner, Weinberger, and McClelland (1991) found TAT 
and corresponding PRF measures were uncorrelated for achievement and power 
motivation. The measures were also related to different behaviors. Using a median split 
for the distribution of both PRF and TAT scores, ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction  in which high TAT and the PRF scores led to recall of different types of 
words in a memory task. Those high in self-reported need for achievement recalled 
achievement-related words better than unrelated words. Those high in implicit 
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achievement motivation, in contrast, recalled fewer achievement-related words compared 
to other words. On the other hand, those high in implicit power were more accurate in 
identifying supervisors and employees in photographs compared to those low in implicit 
power motivation, but self-reported power motivation was unrelated to performance on 
this task. In addition, the PRF and TAT measures were found to differentially interact 
with incentive conditions. ANOVA revealed a significant interaction in which those with 
high self-reported achievement scores recalled more words when expectations were high 
compared to neutral expectation. Low self-reported achievement had the opposite effect 
on recall. In contrast, differences in expectations did not interact with the implicit need 
for achievement. The authors concluded that for both achievement and power motives, 
self-reported and the TAT scores are uncorrelated, related to different behavioral 
outcomes, and “triggered by qualitatively different aspects of the environment” (p. 79). 
A meta-analysis by Spangler (1992) found that TAT and self-report measures of 
achievement motivation share less than 1% of their variance. The TAT was found to be a 
better predictor of spontaneous achievement behavior such as task performance and 
social behavior as well as long-term outcomes like income, sales success, promotions, 
and leadership roles. In contrast, self-report measures were found to be better predictors 
of other explicit measures of attitudes, opinions, grades, personality, and other test scores. 
In addition, the type of incentive moderated predictions. The TAT was found to predict 
spontaneous achievement behavior “extraordinarily well” (p. 150) in the presence of 
activity incentives. Self-report measures  were found to predict spontaneous achievement 
behavior in the presence of explicit social incentives.  
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In summary, the dissociative hypothesis was supported by correlational, 
experimental, and meta-analytic studies comparing TAT and self-report measures. Each 
provided evidence in line with the process dissociation procedure to suggest separate 
personality systems. The TAT and self-reported assessments were found to be 
uncorrelated. They predicted different types of behavior. And their relationships with 
criteria were affected differently by environmental cues.  
 
Conditional Reasoning Test 
 
The Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression (CRT-A) measures the tendency 
to use latent reasoning biases called justification mechanisms (JMs) “whose purpose for 
aggressive individuals is to enhance the logical appeal of their behavioral choices” 
(James, 1998, p. 131). JMs promote feelings of frustration, anger, peril, resentment, and 
loss of dignity. This provides a context for aggressive individuals to portray themselves 
as victims of hostility, exploitation, inequity, and degradation. It also allows aggressive 
individuals to perceive their behavior as reasonable and socially appropriate. JMs thus 
serve to rationalize the aggressive motive and its consequences.  
CRT-A items are similar to those of standardized of reasoning tests. However, 
aggressiveness JMs are mapped to one of two logically correct alternatives for each item. 
This alternative appeals to the biased reasoning of aggressive individuals, whereas the 
remaining logical alternative appeals to nonaggressive individuals. In summary, the 
cognitive mechanisms engaged by the CRT-A are unconscious reasoning biases, 
rationalizations, and justifications favoring one‟s aggressive behavior.  
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CRT and self-report measures of aggression typically dissociate in relation to 
each other and different criteria (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James, et al., 
2005). They typically share little variance and often differ in their predictions of 
aggression. For instance, 11 empirical validation studies produced an average correlation 
of .14 between CRT and self-reports scores (James, et al., 2005). The CRT predicted 
criteria such as lying, conduct violations, performance ratings, grievances, theft, and 
fights and fouls in intramural basketball games with a mean validity of .44. In contrast, 
self-report validities averaged .21. Furthermore, dominance analysis (Budescu, 1993) 
revealed that CRT scores contributed relatively more than self-report scores to the overall 
explanation of aggressive behavior. The CRT contributed 74% to 83% of total R
2
, 
outperforming self-reports across all possible subsets regression models including both 
predictors.  The two types of tests often predict different behaviors. Kelly & Lee (2009) 
examined six studies of aggression that compared the CRT and self-reports. The 
predictors were statistically different (Steiger, 1980) for six of twelve aggressive 
behavioral criteria.  
In summary, two standards of the process dissociation procedure have been 
demonstrated for the CRT in relation to self-reported measures of aggressive disposition. 
The two types of measures correlate poorly with each other. And they differ in their 
predictions of objective measures of aggressive behavior, with the CRT being more 
dominant in prediction. It is noteworthy that thus far, no study has addressed differential 
moderation of the predictions of the CRT and self-reports.  
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Implicit Association Test 
 
The IAT uses differences in reaction time (RT) in a double categorization task to 
measure the strength of implicit association between two concepts. It assumes that highly 
associated concepts are processed faster than poorly associated concepts. To assess self- 
concept, it relates the “self” to various dispositional concepts (Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000). For example, to assess aggressive self-concept, four conceptual categories are 
created: Self, Others, Aggressive, and Prosocial. Each category is represented by 
exemplars (e.g., help, nurture, discuss, and befriend for the prosocial category). The 
exemplars are randomly presented, and participants rapidly sort them into a self + 
prosocial or an other + aggressive category. Participants then sort the same stimuli into 
self + aggressive or other + prosocial categories. Scores are based on differences in 
average RT between the two conditions. This indicates the position of one‟s self-concept 
on an idiosyncratic aggressive ↔ pro-social dimension. Faster RT indicates stronger 
automatic self-association. The cognitive mechanism engaged by a self-concept IAT can 
be described as relative strength of automatic self-associations.  
Research using the IAT reveals findings consistent with the standards of the 
process dissociation procedure. First, IAT and self-report measures of personality 
correlate poorly. The first study to compare IAT and explicit measures of self-esteem 
found an average correlation of .17 between four self-report measures and two IAT 
measures (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Second, recent meta-analyses found average 
shared variance of less than 5% between IAT and self-report measures of personality 
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Greenwald, Poehlman, 
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Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Third, IAT and self-report measures of personality predict 
different behaviors. Several studies showed that IAT self-concept measures significantly 
predicted trait-related behavior, whereas self-reports did not. Egloff & Schmukle (2002) 
found this pattern for ratings of nervous hand movement and anxiousness. Steffens and 
Schulze-König (2006) found that IAT self-concept measures of neuroticism, 
extroversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness respectively predicted self-reported 
and observer-rated stress, time spent in social activities, observer-rated agreeableness, 
and performance on a concentration task. NEO-PI-R measures of Extroversion and 
Openness respectively predicted self-reported preference for group activities and self-
reported attendance of cultural events. Also, the meta-analysis by Greenwald, et al. 
(2009) showed that the IAT personality measures outperformed self-report measures in 
their predictions of various criteria. Finally, task difficulty (famous vs. obscure names in 
a recognition task) was found to differentially moderate self-esteem measured by the IAT 
and self-reports (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Self-esteem measured by an IAT 
interacted with task difficulty in determining ratings of task importance and future task 
performance. Task difficulty had no effect on explicit measures.  
To summarize, research that has compared explicit and IAT measures of self-
concept and self-esteem has demonstrated all three standards of the process dissociation 
procedure. The different measures produced low intercorrelations, prediction of different 
criteria, and differential interaction with characteristics of the performance situation.  
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Summary of Dual Process Evidence in Personality Research 
 
Research using three distinctly different implicit measures have produced 
evidence for dual processes in personality. In broad support for the dissociative 
hypothesis of McClelland et al. (1989), the TAT, the IAT, and the CRT lack correlation 
with each other. Each also predicts different criteria compared to self-report personality 
measures. Research using the TAT and the IAT showed that they were different than self-
reports with respect to interactions with situational variables. The relationship of self-
reports to behavior was shown in several studies to be affected by social cues (e.g., 
instructions), whereas the relationship of the TAT to dependent variables was unaffected 
by social cues. IAT but not self-report measures of self-esteem were found to interact 
with task difficulty in determining various ratings of task importance and future task 
performance. Differential moderation of criterion relationships for CRT and self-report 
measures of personality has not yet been tested.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG IMPLICIT MEASURES 
 
Most alternatives to traditional implicit (projective) measures were developed 
only in recent years. Though little research compares distinct implicit measures of 
personality, a lack of intercorrelation, differences in prediction, and differences 
situational moderation are consistently evident.  
 
The CRT and the TAT 
 
One of the first studies to compare distinct implicit measures was described by 
James (1998). When Smith, DeMatteo, Green, & James (1995) compared TAT and CRT 
measures of achievement motivation, they found a non-significant relationship between 
the two measures. They were also differentially correlated with achievement criteria. The 
CRT predicted grade point average and American College Testing (ACT) scores. The 
TAT was not significantly correlated with either criteria.  James (1998) suggested the 
lack of correlation might be explained by differences in the way the measures are 
conceptualized, operationalized, and scored. The TAT taps absolute motive strength 
revealed through content analysis of free response fantasy stories. In contrast, the CRT 
bases motive strength on actuarial scoring of standardized responses to reasoning 
problems. The degree of correspondence between the coding categories of the TAT and 
the JMs underlying the CRT were also implicated in the lack of correlation.  
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IAT and Seven Implicit Measures 
 
Bosson, et al. (2000) compared seven implicit measures of self-esteem in single 
exploratory study. These include an Implicit Association Test (IAT) for self-esteem 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), a Supraliminal Attitude-Prime Task (Hetts Sakuma, 
Pelham, 1999), a Subliminal attitude-prime task (Spalding & Hardin, 2000), a Stroop 
Color-Naming task (Stroop, 1935), an Implicit Self-Evaluation Survey (ISES; Pelham 
and Herts, 1999), an Initials-Preference Task (IPT) and a Birthday-Preference Task 
(BPT).  
Bosson et al. (2000) found most correlations among the seven implicit measures 
to be weak and nonsignificant. Only the correlation between the initials preference and 
the birthday preference tasks was significant. The implicit measures generally failed to 
predict the criteria, which were explicit ratings of various sorts. Of forty-two possible 
validities, only six were significant and none exceeded .26.  
Most of the implicit measures predicted different criteria depending on 
presentation order. For example, when it was presented before explicit measures, only the 
IAT was marginally correlated with judges ratings of competence and self-certainty. 
When explicit measures came first, however, six implicit measures were marginally to 
moderately related to at least one criterion. Furthermore, the each implicit measures 
tended to predict different criteria than the other implicit measures. For example, when 
preceded by explicit measures the IAT predicted judges‟ ratings of global self-esteem, 
and it was marginally related to self-liking. None of the other implicit measures were 
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related to these two criteria. As noted above, the IAT predicted neither of these criteria 
when it was presented before the explicit measures.  
 
IAT and Six Implicit Measures 
 
Rudolph, Schröder-Abé, Schütz, Gregg, & Sedikides (2008) conducted three 
exploratory studies to compare and contrast IPT and IAT measures of self-esteem with 
newer versions of the initials-preference test along with some other implicit measures. 
Unlike the IAT which compares two categories (self vs. others), the newer RT measures 
were designed to assess associations with a single attitude object. These newer measures 
include the Duplicate Initials-Preference Test (D-IPT) which was developed by the 
authors, the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003), the 
Identification EAST (ID-EAST; De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007), the Single-Category 
IAT (SC-IAT; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), and the Go/No-Go Association Task 
(GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).  
Rudolph, et al. (2008) found in their first study that the IPT, the IAT the EAST 
were not significantly correlated with each other. Their second study examined the D-
IPT, the IAT, the SC-IAT, and the ID-EAST. The implicit measures were again 
uncorrelated. Their third study evaluated two versions of the IAT based on different 
scoring algorithms and five indices derived from the GNAT including a difference score 
similar in form to the IAT. They thought structural correspondence between the GNAT 
and the IAT would yield larger correlations, but none exceeded .27.    
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The IAT and the TAT 
 
Sheldon, King, Houser-Marko, Osbaldiston, & Gunz, (2007) adapted TAT 
measures to a format similar to a Power-Intimacy IAT by computing difference scores 
based on TAT power and intimacy scores. The authors measured life satisfaction, 
psychological well-being, choices in job and academic preferences, and choices and 
reasons in consuming or conserving communal resources in a social dilemma task. The 
Power-Intimacy IAT was weakly related to the corresponding bipolar scores for the TAT. 
The IAT and the TAT were uncorrelated with most of the outcome variables. The IAT 
was weakly correlated with choosing to consume communal resources and indicating 
exploitative reasons for expending those resources. The TAT was uncorrelated with those 
outcomes, but it was weakly correlated with power-related job choices.  
 
Summary of Studies Comparing Implicit Measures  
 
The combined findings of the studies point to a tendency for implicit measures to 
behave independently. In short, they dissociate. The CRT and TAT were shown to be 
independent measures of the achievement motive and to differentially predict 
achievement criteria (James, 1998). The IAT, several other RT measures, two implicit 
preference tasks, and a projective measure of self-esteem were found to be poorly 
correlated, to predict different criteria, and to respond differently to contextual cues in 
their predictions (Bosson, et al., 2000). Furthermore, the IAT and several related 
measures of self-esteem had low intercorrelations, even when conceptual similarity, 
   18
scoring differences, individual differences, and random error were controlled (Rudolph, 
et al., 2008). Finally, IAT and TAT measures of power-intimacy were uncorrelated and 
predicted different preferences and behavioral choices (Sheldon, et al., 2007).  
 
Common Expectations of Convergence  
 
Findings that suggest separate and distinct implicit personality systems are 
troubling for researchers expecting significant overlap in variance, process, and 
predictions. The following comments typify this viewpoint:  
“[D]isappointingly, the seven measures of implicit self-esteem were not positively 
correlated with one another” (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000, p. 1035). 
“(W)e find the lack of intercorrelations among implicit self-esteem measures to be 
worrisome, both theoretically and empirically.” (Bosson, et al., 2000, p. 640). 
“One of the most disturbing trends to emerge in the literature on implicit 
measures is the many reports of disappointingly low correlations among the 
measures” (Fazio & Olsen, 2003, p. 311).  
These sentiments reflect an expectation that different implicit measures of the 
same personality domain will follow a pattern of convergent validity. Substantial shared 
variance is expected, because different implicit measures are assumed to tap a common 
source of variance and to represent a common implicit construct. It follows from the 
literal interpretations of dual processes that different implicit measures of a particular 
psychological domain (e.g., aggression) should converge as alternate representations of a 
single underlying unconscious process. However, the literal interpretation seems 
incomplete. 
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A Different Perspective  
 
Divergence among different implicit measures may be due to divergence among 
the underlying cognitive mechanisms they represent. For instance, agreement across dual 
process theories is not complete, and even what to call these systems is a subject debate. 
A number of labels have been proposed, including such terms as controlled/automatic 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), self-attributed/implicit (McClelland, et al., 1989), 
explicit/implicit (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), rational/experiential (Epstein , 1994), 
System 1/System 2 (Kahneman, 2003), and many more. The particular terms generally 
reflect the novel elements and emphases of the various accounts. They also reflect 
debates about the unique implicit characteristics championed by the individual theories 
(De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Samuals, 2006).  
More to the point of this study, some suggest a more complex implicit system 
involving multiple independent implicit processes. For example, Roser & Gazzaniga 
(2004) in the field of brain research suggest that a complex of circumscribed modular 
processes occupy distinct neurological locations, operate automatically, and operate 
outside of conscious control. In a similar vein, Stanovich (2004) in the field of thinking 
and reasoning proposes a single explicit analytical system exercising targeted control 
over a set of domain-specific implicit systems that operate autonomously and in parallel 
to each other. Hofmann & Wilson (in press), studying self-regulation in the field social 
psychology, postulate an explicit system that selectively brings the output of autonomous 
implicit modules into conscious awareness and allows otherwise independent systems to 
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selectively share information. However, no research has appeared in personality or other 
research to test these speculations.  
Collectively, this information encourages hypotheses of multiple implicit 
personality processes that are independent of explicit processes and also independent of 
each other. Several considerations support this idea. First, the earlier discussion of the 
cognitive mechanisms theorized to underlie three prominent implicit measures of 
personality shows that they are operationalized in different ways, and they are theorized 
to represent distinct concepts. The TAT represents unconscious preoccupations, concerns, 
or goals. The IAT represents automatic self-associations, and the CRT represents 
unconscious reasoning biases, rationalizations, and justifications. Second, when 
compared within the same study, these measures were found to be independent. The 
relationships of the CRT and the TAT reported by James (1998) indicate independence 
between the two. Sheldon, et al. (2007) likewise reported relationships that suggest 
independence between the IAT and the TAT. The relationships between the other implicit 
measures, criteria, and contextual variables reported by Bosson, et al., (2000) and 
Rudolph, et al., (2008) also suggest a general independence among implicit measures of 
personality. Thus, there is reason to suppose that implicit measures behave in relation to 
each other as they do in relation to explicit measures. The evidence suggests that they 
behave as measures of independent personality processes.   
If different implicit and explicit measures of aggressive personality can be shown 
to lack correlation with each other and to predict different behaviors depending on the 
behavior and the stimulus conditions, then, according to the standards of the process 
dissociation procedure, it might be concluded that each measure represents an 
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independent personality process.  This study tests these possibilities by examining the 
predictions and the situational moderations of one explicit measure, the Anger-Hostility 
scale of the NEO-PI-R (NEO-AH), and two contemporary implicit measures, the CRT of 
Aggression (CRT-A) and an Aggressive Self-Concept IAT (IAT-A). Participants play a 
popular computer game under incentive and non-incentive conditions. Four criteria were 
chosen to represent aggressive behavior. One was measured in both incentive conditions 
to assess situational moderation of predictions. Further clarification is provided in the 
Methods section. But first, the hypotheses of the study are stated below.   




The NEO-AH, the CRT-A the IAT-A are generally predicted to (1) intercorrelate 
poorly, (2) to respond differently in the predictions of aggressive behavior when 
incentive conditions change, and (3) to differ in their predictions of the four behavioral 
criteria of aggression. These are presented as specific hypotheses below.  
Hypothesis #1.  The NEO-AH, the CRT-A and the IAT-A will intercorrelate in 
the range of .20 to .30 or lower.  
Hypothesis #2.  The NEO-AH, the CRT-A, and the IAT-A will differ in the 
moderation of their validities by different incentive conditions.  
Hypothesis #2A. The  NEO-AH will significantly predict behavior  in incentive 
conditions, but it will not predict behavior  in non-incentive conditions.  
Hypothesis #2B. The CRT-A will predict behavior the same in incentive and non-
incentive conditions.  
Hypothesis #2C. The IAT-A will predict behavior the same in incentive and non-
incentive conditions.  
Hypothesis #3. The NEO-AH, the CRT-A, and the IAT-A will differ from each 
other in their predictions of each of the four dependent variables.  
Hypotheses #3A - #3L. The NEO-AH, the CRT-A and the IAT-A will 
significantly differ from each other in magnitude or direction in two-tailed pairwise 
comparisons of their predictions of each of the four behavioral criteria.  






Participants came from the participant pool of a large Southeastern university (n = 
194). They ranged in age from 18 to 30 years with a mean of 20.18, and standard 
deviation of 1.95. Participants included 54.1% male, 41.8% female, and 4.1% who did 
not report their gender. Ethnicities of participants were represented by 57.7% white, 
24.7% Asian, 6.7% black, 4.1% Hispanic, and 1.5% other. Another 5.2% did not report 
their ethnicities. Participants earned extra credit applied to a current psychology course, 
one chance in 1000 to win a $500 prize, and an extra 0 to 10 chances in 1000 to win 
based on performance on a modified Tetris game described below.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
 
Tetris-like game. The popular computer game of Tetris
©
 was modified to present 
two different stimulus conditions. Participants received brief instructions about the game 
and use of the buttons on the game controller. The non-incentive condition was 
introduced as a five minute practice session with no influence on chances to win the $500 
prize. The game was played as a normal game of Tetris. Geometric shapes descend on the 
screen, and participants use buttons on a game controller to arrange the shapes into rows 
on the bottom of the screen. An incentive condition was created by explaining the 
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performance-based incentives before beginning the second condition. This phase lasted 
20 minutes. The rules and objectives of the game were the same, but the game randomly 
reversed the effects of some controller buttons. This made the game difficult and 




Measures included two implicit and one explicit personality measures and four 
behavioral criterion measures of aggressiveness. The two implicit measures included the 
Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression (CRT-A; James, 1998) and an Implicit 
Association Test for Aggressive Self-Concept (IAT-A; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
The explicit personality measure was the Aggressive-Hostile Scale of the Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory (NEO-AH; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Four objective behavioral 
criteria of aggressiveness were also included: 1) spontaneous pauses in game play during 
the non-incentive period, and 2) spontaneous pauses in game play during the incentive 
period. These were unobtrusively recorded by the computer. Also included were two 
handwritten responses: 3) accuracy in recording game results, and 4) optional written 
complaints about game procedures.  
The Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression. The CRT-A is comprised of 25 
questions. It includes 22 conditional reasoning items to measure aggression and three 
unscored standard reasoning problems as distracters to strengthen the plausibility of the 
CRT-A as a test of reasoning abilities. Each aggressive response receives a “+1”, and all 
other alternatives receive a “0”. Total scores are calculated by summing responses 
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according to procedures recommended by James and McIntyre (2000).  High scores 
indicate JMs for aggression are influential in reasoning, and implies a cognitive readiness 
to engage in some form of aggressive behavior. Mid-range scores (e.g., three to six) 
indicate JMs are only occasionally involved in shaping reasoning. Low scores (e.g., zero 
to two) indicate JMs are not instrumental in one‟s reasoning. Low scores indicate little 
implicit readiness or predisposition to engage in aggressive behaviors. James et al. (2005) 
reports the reliability of the complete 22 item scale comprising the CRT-A as .76 using 
the Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 coefficient which computes an average item-total 
polyserial coefficient. Alternate forms reliability is reported to be .83.  
The Implicit Association Test. The IAT has been used to assess implicit automatic 
self-associations such as self-concepts or self-esteem (e.g., Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 
2002; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). An IAT for Aggressive Self-Concept (IAT-A) was 
constructed using publically available tools and procedures
1
. Its concept categories and 
the thematic content of exemplar words closely match the contrasting aggressive and 
prosocial motive categories of the CRT-A, which also closely match those used in 
previous IAT research on Aggression (Blümke, & Zumbach, 2007; Gollwitzer, Banse, 
Eisenbach, & Naumann, 2007). The IAT-A based its concept categories (i.e., self and 
others) and the associated exemplars words on those reported by Greenwald, Banaji, 
Rudman, Farnham, & Mellott, (2002). Four exemplar words were chosen, because that 
number is in the optimal range reported by Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji (2007). The 
                                                 
 
 
1 Materials provided by Anthony G. Greenwald, PhD at  <http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_materials.htm>. 
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structure and scoring of the IAT-A were based on recommendations of Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji (2003).   
The IAT-A was combined with a similarly constructed IATs for Dominance Self-
Concept and Achievement Self-Concept. These bolstered the cover story, which stated 
the purpose of the study was to examine the relationships among general personality, 
reasoning ability, and mental rotation ability.  
The IAT is popular, in part, because it achieves greater reliability than most other 
implicit measures, especially those based on RT. For example, Bosson et al. (2000) 
reported a split-half reliability of .69 for a self-esteem IAT in contrast to -.05 to .28 for 
other RT measures of implicit self-esteem. Split-half correlations and alphas for IAT 
measures typically range from .7 to .9 (Schmukle & Egloff, 2004). For example, four 
studies with samples ranging from 9,491 to 22,648 produced split-half reliabilities 
ranging from .89 to .92 (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). A recent meta-analysis reported an 
average test-retest reliability of .56 (Nosek et al., 2007).   
Anger and Hostility scale of the NEO-PI-R. The Anger and Hostility scale is one 
of six facets in the NEO-PI-R that are part of the neuroticism factor (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). It is an eight item self-report measure that assesses one‟s self described aggressive 
characteristics. Respondents rate self-descriptive propositions about their anger and 
hostility on a 5 point Likert scale. Items include such as “I often get angry at the way 
people treat me” and “I am known as hot-blooded and quick-tempered.”  
To further support the plausibility of the study‟s concern for general personality 
rather than aggression, the NEO-AH was combined with 21 unscored items of another 
self-report measure of aggression and 31 additional unscored items unrelated to 
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aggression. A manipulation check asked 20 participants to describe the purpose of the 60 
item self-report measure. Only two noticed that any questions addressed anger or 
hostility. None could describe the purpose of the study. 
Mental Rotation Test. Procedures included an unscored mental rotation test in 
order to support the cover story. This test included twelve IRT-calibrated mental rotation 
items of variable difficulty (Embretson, 1997). Items required participants to match an 
unfolded cube with marks on the facets to the correct one of several similarly marked 
cubes that might be formed if the target shape were folded into a cube.  
Harmful pauses. The researcher informed participants about the functions of the 
buttons on the game controller, including the pause button which temporarily stops the 
game. Participants were instructed to avoid use of the pause button, because it might give 
one an unfair advantage over other participants, it might render their information useless 
for the study, and it might distort the results of the study. These instructions were 
intended to make participants think use of the pause button would disadvantage other 
participants and be harmful to the study. The number of pauses were counted separately 
for the non-incentive and the incentive conditions.  
Inaccuracy in Reporting Game Score. Following the tests and both conditions of 
game play, participants completed a short questionnaire. It asked participants to record 
the number of points they had scored in the second tetramino game lasting 20 minutes. 
Participants were instructed that each point increased chances of winning the $500 prized 
by an additional 1 in 1000. The actual number of points for each participant was recorded 
by the computer. Participants received a 0 for an accurate report and a 1 for an inaccurate 
score report that was greater than or less than the number recorded by the computer. Both 
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over reporting and under reporting were considered aggressive responses, because over 
reporting resulted in unearned chances to win, and under reporting was considered 
careless and harmful, because it subverted the intent of the scoring system and the study. 
Complaints. The questionnaire also asked participants to indicate that they 
understood the instructions and to provide any comments or recommendations about the 
procedures. Participants received a 0 for no complaint and a 1 for an indication they did 




Instructions established the pretext that the study was designed to examine 
relationships among personality traits, mental reasoning, and mental rotation abilities. 
Additional personality measures assessing nonaggressive constructs reinforced this 
pretext. This enhanced the appearance of the CRT-A as an inductive reasoning test.  
Upon arrival to the lab, the researcher led each participant to a private computer 
carrel for administration of mental rotation and personality tests. The CRT-A, the IAT, 
and the NEO-AH measures were alternated in balanced order, but the mental rotation test 
always occurred last. Participants entered another carrel for the Tetris game. The 
researcher launched the game and made sure the participants understood how to operate 
the controls and score points in the game. The researcher informed participants that they 
would first play a practice game followed by a game that determined their chances to win 
the $500 prize. Following this game, participants wrote down the number of four-line 
eliminations they achieved in the second conditions, and completed a brief demographic 
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questionnaire which asked if they understood the instructions and if they had additional 
comments about study procedures. Participants were then given the option of immediate 
or emailed written debriefing with full disclosure information.  






Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the 
independent and dependent variables. Reliabilities of the independent variables estimated 
in this study appear on the diagonal of Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
a
 of the predictors and criteria 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 




*      




 .33 .09   .77
c
 *     
3.  NEO-AH 
 
20.80 5.16 .05 .06 .79
d
 *    
4.  Pauses – 
        Non-Incentive
e
 
.13 .45 -.36* -.02 .04 --   
5.  Pauses – 
        Incentive
f
 
.17 .37 -.35* .12 .25* .36* --  
6   Incorrect Score
 
        Report
g
 
.27 .45 -.11 .32* .16* .16* -.08 -- 
7.  Complaints about 
        Instructions
h
 
.10 .30 .16* .09 .01 -.14 .02 -.31* 
* p<.05   
a
 Intercorrelations of predictors are product moment correlations. Remaining 




 Guttman Split Half  
d
 Cronbach‟s alpha 
e, f
 Scored as 0 = no pauses in game; 1 = one or more pauses in game 
g
 Scored as 0 = accurate report of game score; 1 = under report or over report of score 
h
 Scored as 0 = no written complaint; 1 = written complaint about procedures  
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Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables. Mean participant scores on 
all three predictors indicated mild to moderate levels of aggressiveness in the sample.  
Reliabilities. The Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 produced a reliability estimate of 
.69 for the CRT-A. A Guttman split-half reliability of .77 was computed for the IAT-A. 
Cronbach‟s Alpha produced reliability estimate of .79 for the NEO-AH. These 
reliabilities proved to be adequate for further analysis.  
Intercorrelations of the Dependent Variables. All four criteria represent low base 
rate phenomena with highly skewed distributions. Accordingly, they were dichotomized, 
and polyserial correlations were computed using PRELIS 2.8 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
2006).  Each accounted for less 13% of the variance in any other dependent variables. 




Hypotheses were based on the standards of process dissociation procedure 
(Bornstein, 2002). If the NEO-AH, the IAT-A, and the CRT-A represent different 
personality processes, they should intercorrelate poorly, differ in their moderation by 
situational cues, and differ in their predictions of behavioral criteria of aggressiveness.  
Hypothesis 1: Lack of Intercorrelation among the Predictors. The predictors 
produced relatively normal distributions, although the CRT-A was slightly skewed. Thus, 
product moment correlations assessed relationships between each pair of the aggression 
predictors. Table 1 presents these findings.  As predicted, each implicit measure lacked 
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significant correlation with the explicit measure of aggression. More noteworthy, as 
predicted, the two implicit measures of personality shared no significant variance.  
Hypothesis 2: Inequalities in Predictions in Different Incentive Conditions. 
Hypotheses 2A through 2C anticipate differences in predictions of game pauses across 
the two incentive conditions. Rows 4 and 5 of Table 1 show the validities for each 
predictor in both incentive conditions. In order to compare these correlations, two 
problems require remedy. First, limits to the experiment-wise Type I error rate are 
required. Second, in order to compare the correlations of two variables with a third, the 
covariance between the two variables must be accounted for (Steiger, 1980). Therefore, a 
two-step procedure was used.  
The first step applied an omnibus test of the equality of the validities. This is 
analogous to an omnibus test in analysis of variance prior to planned comparisons 
(Larzelere & Mulaik, 1977). It used structural equation modeling (SEM) software 
(LISREL; Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 2006) to simultaneously test each pair of validities. The 
covariances between each predictor and dependent variable were constrained to equality 
without specifying a value (Cheung & Chan, 2004; Preacher, 2006). This created a model 
of equivalent validities where each constraint comprised a test of differences in validities. 
The overall test produced a significant goodness of fit statistic (χ
2
 = 10.17; df = 3; p = 
.017; RMSEA =.11). Thus, the model of equivalent validities was rejected. As predicted, 
at least one significant difference in validity across incentive conditions was detected.  
The second step determined if the explicit and implicit measures dissociate in the 
moderation of their predictions by changes in incentive conditions. This involved three 
two-tailed t-tests to separately test hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C. To maintain the overall 
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Type I error rate at the nominal level (p = .05), Bonferonni corrections were made to the 
alpha level for each test (p = .05/2/3 = .008, critical t = ±2.58).  
Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C: Validities of the NEO-AH will vary by incentive 
conditions, but the validities of the CRT-A and the IAT-A will not vary. These are 
pairwise comparisons made column-by-column for the validities on rows 4 and 5 of 
Table 1. Each used a t-test for differences between two correlations that share an index. 
Steiger (1980) referred this test as T2, recommending it above tests formulated by Peters 
& Van Voorhis (1940), Hotelling (1940), and Dunn and Clark (1969) due to its 
superiority in meeting its distributional assumptions in small and large samples. Table 2 
presents the results. As predicted, the validities of the NEO-AH varied significantly with 
changes in incentive conditions, (T2 = 6.47; p < .008), but no significant differences were 
seen for the CRT-A (T2 = 1.36; ns) and the IAT-A (T2 = 1.31; ns). 
 
Table 2: T2 values for significant differences in the validities of the implicit and 
explicit predictors in predicting Game Pauses in different incentive conditions 
CRITERION NEO-AH CRT-A IAT-A 
Game Pauses in Non-Incentive Conditions 
6.47* 1.36 ns 1.31 ns 
Game Pauses in Incentive Conditions 
* Steiger‟s T2 t-test (p < .008) 
 
Hypothesis 3: The NEO-AH, the CRT-A and the IAT-A will significantly differ in 
their predictions of behavior. A complete test involves 12 pairwise comparisons made 
row-by-row for the validities seen in Table 1. The two-step process using LISREL and 
the T2 test was again used. The covariances between each of three predictors and each 
dependent variable were constrained to equality to create a model of equivalent validities. 
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This produced a significant goodness of fit test (χ
2
 = 82.03; df = 8; p = 0.00; RMSEA 
=.20). The model of overall equivalent validities for every predictor predicting every 
behavioral criterion was rejected. Thus, as hypothesized, at least one significant 
difference was detected in the simultaneous comparisons of validities of the predictors 
across all of the criteria.  
This result justifies row-by-row pairwise comparisons for the validities seen in 
Table 3. This involves twelve two-tailed t-tests labeled as Hypotheses 3A through 3L. To 
maintain the overall Type I error rate at the nominal level (p = .05), Bonferonni 
corrections were made to the alpha level for each separate test (p = .05/2/12 = .002, 
critical t = ±3.09). Each comparison applies the T2 test of dependent correlations. 
Hypothesis 3A thru 3L. Table 3 summarizes the set of T2 tests of Hypotheses 3A 
– 3L. It can be seen that five of the twelve hypotheses were supported by the analysis.  
 
Table 3: T2 values for tests of dissociations among implicit and explicit predictors in 




CRT-A  vs. 
NEO-AH 
IAT-A  vs. 
NEO-AH 
Game Pauses in Non-Incentive Condition -3.63* -4.17* -0.56 
Game Pauses in Incentive Condition -5.04* -6.53* -1.32 
Incorrect Score Report  -4.52* -2.72 1.60 
Complaints  0.67 1.51 0.85 
* p <.002; critical two-tailed T2 = ±3.09 
 
The CRT-A and the IAT-A differed significantly in their predictions of Game 
Pauses in Non-Incentive and Incentive conditions. The CRT-A and the IAT-A did not 
differ significantly in their predictions of Complaints. The CRT-A and the NEO-AH 
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differed significantly in their predictions of Game Pauses in Non-Incentive and Incentive 
conditions. The CRT-A and the NEO-AH did not differ significantly in their prediction of 
Incorrect Score Report or Complaints. The IAT-A and the NEO-AH did not differ 
significantly in their predictions of any of the behavioral criteria of aggression. Finally, 
the CRT-A, the IAT-A, and the NEO-AH did not differ in their predictions of 
Complaints. 




The results support a model of aggressive personality that incorporates at least 
two implicit processes independent of each other as well as the explicit process, but the 
evidence is incomplete. It supports a complete dissociation between the CRT-A and the 
NEO-AH, because they were uncorrelated, differentially moderated by incentive 
conditions, and otherwise predictive of different behaviors. It suggests the IAT-A and the 
NEO-AH represent independent personality processes that differ in their response to 
incentives, but it raises questions about the lack of differentiation in their predictions. 
Importantly, it also suggests the CRT-A and the IAT-A represent independent implicit 
personality processes that contribute to different aggressive behaviors regardless of 
incentive conditions. But it leaves questions about what conditions moderate predictions 
of implicit measures. The following sections interpret and elaborate upon these results, 
address the niggling questions, and suggest future directions for research.  
 
Dissociation of the CRT-A and the NEO-AH 
 
The analysis provided strong indications that the CRT-A and NEO-AH represent 
separate personality processes. They met all of the standards of the process dissociation 
procedure. They lacked correlation, they differed in moderation of their predictions by 
incentive conditions, and they statistically differed in the prediction of aggressive criteria. 
These findings replicate findings of previous research comparing CRT measures to 
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explicit measures (James, 1998; James & Mazzerolle, 2002; James, McIntyre, Glisson, 
Bowler, & Mitchell, 2004; James et al., 2005; Kelly & Lee, 2009). Differences in 
situational moderation have now been added to the evidence. It was shown for the first 
time that, unlike the NEO-AH, the predictions of the CRT-A were unaffected by the 
introduction of incentives. The implicit processes of the CRT-A and the explicit 
processes of the NEO-AH appear to represent independent personality processes. Implicit 
reasoning biases that justify aggression and conscious aggressive self-attributions seem to 
operate independently of each other with respect to their intensity, their relationship to 
aggressive behavior, and their response to incentive conditions.   
 
Dissociation of the IAT-A and the NEO-AH 
 
The results partially supported the hypothesis that the IAT-A and NEO-AH 
represent separate personality processes. They met two of the standards of the process 
dissociation procedure. They were uncorrelated, and they differed in moderation of their 
predictions by incentive conditions. Unlike the NEO-AH, the IAT-A was not moderated 
by incentives. Surprisingly, they did not statistically differ in their prediction of any of 
the criteria, a finding inconsistent with the literature. Comparisons encountered in the 
literature, however, were not so stringent in their tests of dependent correlations, typically 
basing comparisons on visual inspection. They lack correlation, respond differently to 
incentives, but predict the same behaviors. Future research should examine this further. 
What the IAT measures in unclear. It has been suggested that the processes 
leading to IAT scores incorporate both automatic and controlled processes (De Houwer, 
   38
et al., 2009; Nosek, 2005; Nosek,et al., 2007; Greenwald, et al., 2009). It is also unclear 
whether the processes underlying the IAT measure implicit associations, competition 
among automatic responses, or unconscious cultural stereotypes (Arkes & Tetlock 2004).  
Metric Arbitrariness. The IAT has sustained criticism for metric arbitrariness, 
because the relative intervals, the meaning of a one-unit change, and the location of the 
observed scores on the continuum of interest are not specified (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). 
With reference to this study, the zero point of the IAT-A is based on differences in RT for 
different concept-attribute combinations. The zero point obtained in this manner 
differentiates aggressive and prosocial self-concept scores within each individual. 
However, differences in the psychometric properties of the conceptual categories (i.e., 
aggressive vs. prosocial) and their possible interaction with attribute exemplar words may 
cause the observed zero point to deviate from the population zero point (Embretson, 
2006). In addition, the score intervals may not be equal, and RT may not be linearly 
related to the construct. Norming the scores also fails to provide sufficient information 
about individuals‟ location on the aggressive-prosocial scale. It provides information only 
about one‟s position relative to others; it provides no information about what this position 
means with respect to behavioral indicators of aggression.  
The IAT measures something with reliability, and it predicts some behavioral 
outcomes, but it measures is questionable. In addition the distinction between the two 
aggressive processes may be questioned, because they did not differ in their predictions. 
Nevertheless, the findings suggest automatic aggressive self-associations and conscious 
aggressive self-attributions operate independently with respect their covariation and 
response to changes in incentive conditions.   
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Dissociation of the CRT-A and the IAT-A 
 
The IAT-A and the CRT-A demonstrated two of three classic standards used to 
establish independent processes. First, the implicit measures were uncorrelated. 
Correlations between dispositional measures might be attenuated if the measures do not 
correspond in their content (Fazio & Olsen, 2003; Hofmann, et al., 2005; Nosek, 2005; 
Schultheiss, Yankova, Dirlikov, & Schad, 2009; also see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970). The 
thematic content of concept categories and the exemplar words of the IAT-A were 
designed to closely match the contrasting aggressive and prosocial motive categories of 
the CRT-A. Nevertheless, the two implicit measures did not correlate. Automatic 
aggressive self-associations (IAT-A) and Implicit reasoning biases that justify aggressive 
behavior (CRT-A) appear to vary with indifference to each other. Second, the CRT-A 
and the IAT-A differed significantly in predicting three of four behavioral criteria. The 
IAT-A significantly predicted Inaccurate Score Reports, whereas the CRT-A did not. The 
CRT-A negatively predicted Game Pauses in both incentive conditions, whereas the IAT-
A did not predict pauses in either incentive condition.  
The CRT-A and the IAT-A did not meet the third standard of dissociation, which 
requires differential moderation by situational cues. A subsequent section examines this 
and the overall pattern of moderation seen in this study. But first, the counterintuitive 
negative correlation between the CRT-A and harmful game pauses is addressed. 
Negative Prediction of Game Pauses by the CRT-A. To be clear, the direction of 
relationship was not particularly relevant to the hypotheses of this study. All statistical 
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tests were two-tailed. Nevertheless, a positive relationship between the CRT-A and 
aggressive behavior is normally expected. However, the results showed that greater use 
of JMs was associated with less use of the pause button. Why would participants most 
prepared to justify aggression pause less than those less prepared to justify aggression?  
One explanation suggests that those prepared to justify aggression simply 
disengaged from the performance task when confronted with the difficulty of the task. 
However, disengagement would also result in a reduction of the other behaviors counted 
in the study, and this was not the case. These individuals did not stop using other buttons 
on the game controller. Only pausing showed a negative relationship with CRT-A scores. 
Therefore, the disengagement explanation does not fit. 
A more plausible explanation involves possible differential effects of the 
instructions based on differential framing. The instructions attempted to establish 
pressing the pause button during game play as an aggressive response. The pause button 
was the only one singled out in the instructions. Instructions discouraged use of the pause 
button, because it might give one an unfair advantage in winning reward, and it might 
negatively affect the results of the study. However, instructions allowed use of the pause 
button to adjust one‟s seating or some similar brief purpose for the sake of comfort. 
Instructions emphasized that too much pausing could negate one‟s score. The meaning of 
“too much” was open to interpretation. This aimed to encourage those with a high 
implicit readiness to aggress to attempt to harm others while improving their own score.  
The instructions may have encouraged the use the pause button by individuals 
who consciously view themselves as aggressive and prosocial individuals. Those who 
explicitly described themselves as aggressive used the pause button  more frequently than 
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others, because that meets the normative expectation for aggressive individuals when 
incentives were in effect. Implicitly prosocial individuals, trusting by nature, suspected 
nothing, accepted the instructions at face value, and occasionally paused the game as 
allowed by the instructions. 
However, individuals with a high implicit readiness to aggress tend to perceive 
situations and people with high levels of suspicion. Such participants are inclined to 
attribute hostile intentions, exploitation, immorality, and hidden agendas to others (James 
& Mazerolle, 2002). They are highly attuned to real and imagined signs of manipulation 
by others. These individuals may have implicitly perceived the instructions as a part of a 
plot manipulate them into using the button. Their unconscious inclinations sensitized 
these participants to the possibility that pausing was of interest to the experimenters. 
Their spontaneous unconscious response was to resist manipulation in order to harm the 
experimenter. They did so by withholding pausing, the response singled out by the 
experimenter.   
 
Moderation of Explicit but Not Implicit Predictions by Socially Conveyed Incentives 
 
As described earlier, the Pause criterion was measured in two different conditions. 
The other two criteria were measured in only one condition, but each can be differentially 
related to the incentive offered in the study. Inaccurate Score Report was associated with 
the incentive, because it was directly related to chances to win the prize. Complaints were 
unrelated to the incentive, because Complaints had no impact on chances to earn the 
reward. Based on these assumptions, Figure 1 depicts the correlations seen in this study. 
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Figure 1. Incentives link explicit but not implicit processes to behaviors 
 
As predicted, criterion relationships of both implicit personality measures were 
unaffected by differences in incentives, but the explicit measure predicted criteria only in 
the presence of incentives. Socially communicated cues, expectations, and incentives 
appear to moderate predictions of explicit measures but not those of implicit measures. 
Perhaps such cues simply provide the wrong information to engage the implicit 
personality. If so, what situational cues might differentially moderate the criterion 
relationships of implicit processes? 
Potential Situational Moderation of Implicit Predictions. There is some evidence 
that certain cues in the performance situation interact with implicit measures in predicting 
behavior. Earlier we saw that prior presentation of explicit personality measures 
moderated the criterion relationships of the IAT and other implicit measures (Bosson, et 
al., 2000). A study by Brunstein & Maier (2005) showed the implicit need for 
achievement (TAT) interacted with self-referenced feedback to predict vigilance task 
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referenced feedback to predict task continuation. Thus, the prior activation of processes 
involved in explicit might affect criterion relationships of automatic self-esteem, while 
information that activates implicit internal comparisons might affect criterion 
relationships of unconscious achievement goals. 
Schultheiss (2001, 2009) proposed that implicit motives respond to incentives 
represented and perceived nonverbally (i.e., nondeclarative stimuli), whereas explicit 
motives respond to incentives perceived in a verbal-symbolic format (i.e., declarative 
stimuli). For example, facial expressions of emotion seem to engage personality (and 
brain) processes associated with social motives measured by the TAT (Schultheiss, & 
Hale, 2007; Schultheiss, Wirth, Waugh, Stanton, & Meier, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; 
Stanton, Hall & Schultheiss, 2010). Additional research may yet identify conditions that 
changes criterion relationships for one but not another implicit measure.   
 
Dichotomies or Multichotomies in Dissociative Theories? 
 
Explicit, consciously generated measures predicted behavior when task-extrinsic, 
socially-mediated cues and incentives were in effect. When situational cues were weak or 
absent, explicit personality was unrelated to behavior, whereas presence of such cues 
linked explicitly measured personality to behavior. Task-extrinsic social cues (e.g., 
expectations, norms, incentives) seem to have no impact on the predictions of implicit 
measures.  
What is missing is that we do not fully understand which criteria and which cues 
are associated with which implicit measure. The pattern of behavioral prediction, 
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however, is not a dichotomy in which implicit measures predict one kind of behavior and 
explicit measures predict another kind of behavior. The pattern of behavioral prediction 
appears to be one of criterion-specific relationship to explicit processes, which can be 
overridden by engaging explicit personality processes through socially communicated, 
task-extrinsic cues. In other words, explicit measures can predict the same behaviors as 
implicit measures if incentives are in effect. 
Dichotomies of behaviors such as, automatic vs. controlled, operant vs. 
respondent, or spontaneous vs. deliberate get it half-right. They tell us the conditions 
under which explicit measures will predict which behavior, but they cannot tell us which 
kind of behavior will or will not be related to which specific implicit measure in which 
specific condition. The implicit half of dual process theories needs to be further 
elaborated according to the varieties of implicit processes, which seem to predict only 




The results of this study provided evidence of dissociation between the implicit 
processes measured by the CRT-A and the IAT-A. Unconscious reasoning processes that 
justify aggression appear to operate independently of automatic self-associations with 
aggression. Furthermore, this study replicates common findings of dissociation between 
the CRT-A and explicit measures. Unconscious reasoning processes that justify 
aggression appear to operate independently of conscious self-attributions of aggression. If 
supported by subsequent research these findings would represent a significant theoretical 
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contribution to our understanding of the relationships of conscious and unconscious 
personality processes to each other and to their behavioral outcomes. It introduces the 
prospect that, depending on conditions, multiple unconscious processes operate 
independently with respect to each other as well as to an independent conscious process 
in predicting different domain specific behaviors. We may need a theory that relates 
multiple independent processes to one another, to conditions, and to criterion variables 
based on their underlying implicit and explicit cognitive processes.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions  
 
This was not an experiment. Although the situation was manipulated, no random 
assignment to conditions was effected. In addition, the manipulation of incentive 
conditions was confounded with the frustrating element of re-mapping the function of the 
game controller buttons. Although the hypotheses were concerned only with changes in 
conditions, these effects need to be teased apart. Experimental methods and larger 
samples would increase our confidence in findings that address the effects of changes in 
situations upon the relationships of implicit measures to behavioral outcomes.  
Potential moderators of the predictions of implicit measures need to be included 
in future research to test the hypothesis of differential moderation of implicit predictions. 
In particular, the distinction between IAT measures of personality and explicit measures 
needs to be clarified. In general, additional implicit measures, such as the TAT, the 
Differential Framing Test (DFT; LeBreton, 2002), and the Implicit Trait Policy (ITP; 
Motowidlo, Hooper, & Jackson, 2006). We need to discern any pattern with respect to 
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implicit processes and a potential typology of behavioral criteria predicted by implicit 
measures. Is there isomorphism between the implicit processes, evocative conditions, and 
predicted behaviors? Do different stimuli engage different implicit processes?  
Finally, further research is needed to investigate the possibility of not only 
independent, but also interacting implicit processes (cf., channeling; Winter, John, 
Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998; Frost, Ko, & James., 2007; Bing, LeBreton, Davison, 
Migetz, & James, 2007) including higher order interactions. The evidence for 
independent nonconscious personality processes uncovered in this research is far from 
conclusive. However, it would seem to justify, and even indicate, the need for further 
research to explore this new development in personality research. 
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